INTRODUCTION
Within the past several decades, there has been an explosion in the creation, institutionalization and use of "alternative" dispute resolution procedures. Understood broadly, these procedures include formal and informal administrative adjudication, as well as arbitration, mediation and other court-connected and agency-connected innovations. In general, reformers conceived these "alternative" processes as means to end legal (or potentially legal) disputes and escape the perceived costs and inadequacies of traditional civil litigation and trials. Over the years, and perhaps counterintuitively, courts have embraced these processes. Indeed, courts have become such advocates for these processes that they have mandated their use in litigation (in the case of court-connected mediation), enforced rules that make their use a condition precedent to court access (in the case of administrative adjudication), and enforced their use pursuant to contract evolution of the deferential standards of review that courts apply to ERISA plan benefit denials by private claims administrators, particularly when such administrators operate in a conflicted decision-making context. In this context, the Supreme Court has managed to acknowledge the existence of structural bias and make it a relevant and important factor to be considered as part of deferential judicial review. Further, the Supreme Court has provided guidance to lower courts regarding the weight to be given to structural bias in this context and has provided examples of the information required to assess such weight. Structural bias has been given the stature of tiebreaker in close cases. Finally and most important for the purposes of this Article, the Supreme Court has also incentivized the provision of structural and procedural safeguards in order to reduce the potency of the structural incentives that encourage biased decision-making. In other words, the Supreme Court has incentivized the provision of safeguards that will enhance the likelihood of accurate decision-making-all while maintaining a deferential standard of review.
Corporations continue to experiment with mandatory predispute arbitration clauses. The clause at issue in Concepcion, for example, permitted consumers to bring their claims in small claims court rather than arbitration and incorporated a monetary sanction if AT&T failed to make a good faith settlement offer prior to arbitration. Are these sorts of provisions, by themselves, sufficient to overcome the potential for structural bias? Glenn provides a model for considering these provisions and their sufficiency as procedural safeguards, even while retaining a deferential standard of review. And importantly, in order to assess whether a clause like the one at issue in Concepcion sufficiently reduced potential bias and promoted accuracy, a court using Glenn's model likely would permit discovery regarding the actual implementation of the clause's key provisions. Glenn thus demonstrates the potential for incentivizing the development of improved provisions.
when, in fact, consumers would be required to pay state taxes. 5 Those taxes amounted to a mere $30.22.6 In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, decided in 2012, the plaintiffs alleged that a credit repair organization had similarly defrauded consumers when it advertised a credit card as available at no cost and with an upfront credit line of $300 when, in fact, consumers would be charged immediately with a finance fee, monthly fee and annual fee. In Wanda Greenwood's case, these three fees added up to $257,9 thus depriving her (and the other consumers with a weak credit rating to whom this card was advertised) of all but $43 of the upfront credit line they anticipated.1o Cases with so little at stake hardly seem worthy of the attention of the Supreme Court. But, of course, both Concepcion and CompuCredit involved something more. The consumer contracts at issue in both cases contained mandatory predispute arbitration clauses, each with a provocative legal twist, and claims brought on behalf of a large class of consumers." Small individual claims translate into astonishingly large stakes when aggregated in this way.
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In Concepcion, the arbitration clause in the contract between AT&T and the Concepcions permitted the Concepcions to bring their claims only on an individual basis, however, and then only in arbitration or small claims court.1 3 Thus, the clause required these consumers' waiver of their right to pursue redress through a class action. 14 The Supreme Court determined that the state law of unconscionability that had been developed to bar such waiver was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").1 5 The contract between CompuCredit and Ms. Greenwood similarly involved both an arbitration clause and class action, but the question at issue was whether the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act ("CROA")-and, specifically, the provision 6 in CompuCredit's contract that Ms. Greenwood had the "right to sue" under the CROA-limited the credit company's ability to establish arbitration as the exclusive forum in which a consumer could "sue." 1 Writing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that most consumers would understand this "colloquial" language as providing them with the "legal right, enforceable in court, to recover damages from credit repair organizations that violate the CROA" 8 and, further, that their understanding would be "without regard to whether the suit in court has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding [.] "' 9 On this basis, the Supreme Court concluded that consumers' right to access public courts could and should then be limited to "judicial action compelling or reviewing initial arbitral adjudication., 20 These empiricallyunsupported assertions regarding consumers' understanding of the sequence of legal procedures to be used to implement the protections of the CROA, combined with the statute's failure to include an explicit bar on the use of arbitration, 2 ' paved the way for the Supreme Court's decision that the FAA required the enforcement of the terms of the arbitration clause at issue.
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Concepcion in particular was followed by a flood of commentary 23 21. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to look to a federal statute's text or legislative history to determine whether arbitration is permitted. See, e.g., CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("As the majority opinion notes, the disclosure provision does not itself confer a cause of action, and the liability provision that does is materially indistinguishable from other statutes that we have held not to preclude arbitration. In my mind this leaves the parties' arguments in equipoise, and our precedents require that petitioners prevail in this circumstance. This is because respondents, as the opponents of arbitration, bear the burden of showing that Congress disallowed arbitration of their claims, and because we resolve doubts in favor of arbitration."); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (discussing need to look to federal statute to determine whether arbitration is permitted); Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
22. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673. 23. Interestingly, some of this commentary has tried to place Concepcion in perspective, in a manner that establishes Concepcion as part of a core "trilogy" for arbitration jurisprudence in much the same way that Celotex, Liberty Lobby and Matsushita have been described as summary judgment's core "trilogy. She concludes that Concepcion has so dramatically reduced corporations' assessment of the risk of litigation over the enforcement of arbitration clauses that many more corporations will be compelled to "impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class actions [.] " 2 6 Her prescience may be evidenced by Microsoft's announcement during the summer that it will include an 27 arbitration provision and class action waiver in many of its contracts, although there are also a few courts that are stepping forward to strike down class waivers. 28 Both Concepcion and CompuCredit fit neatly into a larger picture of a Supreme Court that perceives mammoth class actions, and many individual civil rights lawsuits, as generating unproductive income for plaintiffs' and defense lawyers and needlessly disrupting the work of embattled government and business leaders, 29 when our nation needs such leaders to focus their time and resources on re-energizing our economy and protecting us from potential security threats. 30 In this picture, corporations Hamilton argues that the judicial branch is undoubtedly the weakest of the three branches because it lacks the ability to "attack" the other branches, and has little ability to defend itself if the legislative or executive branch attempts to usurp those powers vested in the judicial branch. 3 7 More recently, some have argued that the federal courts have engaged in self-help as they have ordered parties to participate in mediation and other settlement-oriented processes-and have also ordered the parties to pay for the services of these mediators, special masters and other neutrals.
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With Concepcion, CompuCredit and other recent arbitration cases involving disparate parties, 39 however, the Supreme Court is effectively incentivizing the development of a new sort of layer of adjunct judicial officers.
4 0 More specifically, the Court seems to be using the incentive of class waiver to persuade corporations to fund a privatized national small claims court that can then handle the many routine consumer-related disputes that arise. 4 private consumer arbitration 50 (and, presumably, the income received by both types of tribunals in filing fees).
In a majority of these cases, whether they are arbitrated or litigated, consumers owe the monies claimed and either default 5 2 or lose on the merits. 53 As state and federal courts face severe budget cuts, why not allow the affected corporations to elect and pay 5 4 for alternative, more efficient private tribunals to handle such routine matters, with such predicable dynamics and results? 55 The answer to this question is relatively straightforward. Such a transformation inevitably triggers serious constitutional concerns regarding the fundamental right of access to, and protections afforded by, our public (surveying the history of the treatment of high-status prisoners in France and Germany). courts. 56 The vast majority of citizens and residents in the U.S., after all, are likely to be involved in only "small claims," 5 resort to our public courts only infrequently, 58 and need the procedural protections promised by the courts (even though the courts regularly fail, as do all creations of man, to deliver on their promises). 59 Authorizing corporations to shape and fund a national small claims court through which consumers must navigate before they may access public courts, and then limiting such access to deferential judicial review, invites both the perception and the reality of a system that is beset by structural bias. Such perceptions then endanger the public's perception of the courts as a place where they can trust that they will experience justice.o 56. See mandating the enforcement of the award and controlling the scope of Article III review, particularly the extent of review of the merits of federal questions, Congress effectively is stripping federal courts of the power to interpret the meaning of federal law and erecting a system by which others, namely arbitrators, can define it. It also effectively is mandating that federal courts treat the result of this private dispute resolution system as a judgment of a federal court, with all of the accoutrements that accompany that judgment."). 
Concepcion and
CompuCredit have created the conditions that now require courts to either find non-discriminatory6 bases for rejecting class waivers in the arbitration clauses 65 in consumer contracts or counterbalance the rise of this new, privately-funded small claims court with equally-new procedural and structural safeguards. This Article will focus on the latter task. Such safeguards could be designed to enhance the likelihood of sufficient fairness during the fact-finding process-or at least reduce the likelihood of unfairness and biased decision-making.
Importantly, work has already been done to develop such safeguards in the form of protocols and policies. 6 Some of the most respected dispute resolution providers abide by such protocols and policies. 67 Although there are meaningful differences among them, 6 8 there are also many commonalities in terms of their commitment to providing consumers with a neutral and convenient forum, access to information, and services at a reasonable cost. Some of these providers also have established special rules for class action arbitration. Indeed, at one point JAMS determined that it would not administer arbitration clauses containing class waivers. In the face of very negative reactions, however, JAMS revised its policy and will now administer such clauses.o
There is no guarantee that all arbitral providers will adopt procedural safeguards. Many of the terms are likely to reduce efficiency, at least on a short-term basis, and the story of JAMS' brief flirtation with refusing to enforce class waivers hints at the potential consequences that arbitral providers may suffer if they stand alone in taking a position that is unpopular with those choosing which arbitral providers to include in their boilerplate contracts. Essential procedural safeguards are much more likely 71 to be adopted if courts establish incentives to encourage such behavior. 68. For example, Principle 5 of the Consumer Due Process Protocols used by the American Arbitration Association provides that consumer ADR agreements should permit consumers to seek relief in small claims court. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations, in contrast, does not provide for access to small claims court. See id. The Due Process Protocol and JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations also vary in their assurance that consumers will have access in arbitration to all otherwise-available remedies. The Due Process Protocols provide that the arbitrator should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in equity; the JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitration does not provide for all such remedies if the consumer is permitted to pursue otherwise-unavailable remedies in court. 
71.
See also, Farmer, supra note 54, at 2349 (proposing that "in addition to the threat of prosecution [by public attorneys], incentives and mechanisms should be created for arbitration providers and parties who use mandatory arbitration to make their systems of dispute resolution 200 [Vol. 42 At this point, then, it is worth returning to the arbitration provision that was at issue in Concepcion. To begin, it is more accurate to describe this clause as a two-step or tiered dispute resolution provision that is remarkably similar to the provisions used to settle class actions in the past.7
2 Because of the procedural safeguards it contained, the average consumer might have found this clause quite appealing.
To initiate a dispute proceeding, the consumer had only to complete a short online form on the AT&T website.
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AT&T could then offer to settle the claim.
7 5 Thus, both AT&T and the consumer could avoid the cost and time involved in pursuing arbitration.
If AT&T did not make such an offer, or if the dispute was not resolved within thirty days, the consumer could then file a separate demand for arbitration, also through the website.
7 6 The clause further provided that:
* If the parties went to arbitration, AT&T had to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims; 77 * The arbitration had to take place in the county in which the customer was billed; 
Id
* The arbitrator was authorized to award any form of individual relief (and as Justice Scalia's opinion noted, this presumably included punitive damages);" * AT&T was not permitted to seek reimbursement from the consumer for its attorney's fees; 82 and * In the event that the consumer received an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T was then required to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the consumer's attorney's fees."
All of these procedural specifics sound very good. 84 It is worth noting, however, that AT&T inserted some of the most appealing terms only after the Concepcions filed their lawsuit. 85 Apparently, the prospect of appearing before a judge and receiving a legally binding ruling incentivized the inclusion of these procedural specifics. 86 The Ninth Circuit undertook some hard-headed risk analysis in reviewing some of the other terms in the clause, ultimately concluding that a consumer was terribly unlikely to receive the $7,500 premium payment. If a consumer made a small claim in arbitration, for example, AT&T could avoid paying the premium and the consumer's attorney's fees as long as it paid the face value of the claim at any point before the selection of the arbitrator.
8 8 "Thus," according to the Ninth Circuit, "the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30. 22 Court concluded that the Concepcions were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class action, which "could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars." 9 1 Justice Scalia clearly acknowledges the importance of ensuring the attractiveness of alternative procedures and the likelihood that individual consumers will use them to effectuate their legal rights. 92 Recent decisions in the Second Circuit signal that some courts are hearing that message. It could very well be that AT&T's arbitration provision with its online elements, premium payment and potential reimbursement of attorney's fees would encourage consumers to make claims, thus benefitting themselves and alerting AT&T to problem areas.
94 If AT&T then attended to those problem areas (perhaps with the help of an ombuds), 95 95. If AT&T chose to institutionalize an ombudsperson in addition to arbitration, for example, this neutral could collect data regarding arbitral claims and awards in order to make corporate officers aware-quickly-of emerging problems in a particular location or with a particular advertising campaign. The corporation could then take prompt corrective action, rather than waiting until it receives a demand letter threatening a class action. If such an ombudsperson is sufficiently independent and careful-and sufficiently supported by structural and procedural safeguards-she has the potential to serve many of the same public interests served by a private attorney general initiating, and a judge overseeing, a class action. the effect of encouraging responsive change and deterring bad conduct, thus achieving some of the most important effects of class actions. Seen in this light, granting class waiver could be quite reasonable. Rather than thinking of AT&T as a company that required publicly-imposed coercive sanctions to deter bad behavior, such a dispute resolution clause and voluntary corrective action would signal a company that welcomes the opportunity to learn about problems from its customers and improve its goods and services. Such a customer-oriented approach may seem naYve, but it also makes good business sense.
If the clause makes this much sense, it then becomes clear that neither AT&T nor any other company should be allowed to demand class waiver as the quid pro quo for the simple funding of a small claims court. Of course, this is just the sort of demand that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Wireless Association, 97 DirecTV, Comcast and Dell 9 8 made in their amicus briefs to the Court. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court did not need to bow before these threats. At the very least, it could have demanded more in return for consumers' loss of their right to aggregate small claims, especially when the potentially negative effects of such loss were to be compounded by deferential judicial review. In particular, the Supreme Court could have required that if a company seeks and wins a class waiver, any proposed substitute process must be 1) sufficiently attractive to The Chamber also pointed out, however, that "what makes class arbitration truly intolerable to many businesses is the nature of the adverse judgments it can produce. Like class litigation, class arbitration can cripple a business with a gargantuan judgment. But unlike class litigation, where appellate review of a court's certification and merits decisions is robust, the standard for vacating an arbitrator's decision is 'among the narrowest known to law."' Id. at * 14.
97. The Wireless Association's members include all of the major domestic cell phone providers. In its brief, the Association pointed out that businesses typically shoulder most of the costs associated with arbitration, in part because the benefits of individual arbitration make such a subsidization economically viable. If class procedures became allowable, regardless of the waiver language, the Association argued that there would no longer be any rational business incentive to subsidize the cost of arbitration. 98. Among other points, DirecTV, Comcast and Dell observed that Comcast and Amazon had decided to limit, or eliminate entirely, the use of consumer arbitration as a result of the Discover Bank case in California and the Scott case in Washington. Brief ofAmici Curiae Directv, Inc, 2010 WL 3183855, at *16. They also urged that if companies discontinued their use of arbitration, consumers would be hurt due to increased prices. Id. at *19.
encourage consumer complaints and the correction of problems, and 2) sufficiently fair in terms of both process and outcome. 99 At one point in his opinion, though, Justice Scalia suggests that any old rough justice will do in arbitration as long as the process is streamlined, efficient, low cost and speedy. 100 Indeed, he asserts that these are the "fundamental attributes" of arbitration, and anything that interferes with these attributes "creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."o' Such language has encouraged lower courts to interpret the "rules" apparently emerging from Concepcion as strikingly broad-brush and patently undemanding.1 0 2
One is that "[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." 0 3
A second is that "[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons."a Many overburdened state and federal courts are using these sentences from Justice Scalia's opinion as they order consumers and employees away from the courts and away from class proceedings, into privatized bilateral arbitration.'
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These courts are ignoring Justice Scalia's acknowledgement of the specifics of AT&T's clause.
Such easy and undemanding diversion from the courts cannot last. If the Supreme Court is indeed providing an incentive for the private funding of an expanding layer of judicial adjuncts to conduct initial fact-finding, it will also inevitably be called upon to ensure that adjuncts' procedures meet at least the essential requirements of procedural due process. If, as the Supreme Court states in CompuCredit, the courts will be available to play this role only when and if consumers and other one-shot players choose to fight the enforcement of arbitral awards,' 0 9 the rigor of judicial review will become ever more important. Jurisprudence under the FAA, however, presents some unique challenges to achieving such rigor.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
The FAA provides for very limited grounds for the vacatur of arbitral awards and the standard for judicial review of arbitral awards is very deferential." 0 Indeed, under the FAA, judges often must be more deferential to arbitrators than to other judges. Structural bias certainly is not listed as one of the grounds for vacatur.1 The ground for vacatur of arbitral awards that is closest to structural bias is "evident partiality," and courts have been very reluctant to find that structural bias meets the requirements of evident partiality."
2 They have refused, for example, to vacate awards even when the arbitrator has been the employee of one of the parties," 3 or when one of the parties has been represented on the governing board of the trade association that conducted the arbitration. . 2000) , the parties to the arbitration were a corporation and a farmer. They arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration provision in a hedgeto-arrive (HTA) contract. The corporation was a member of the trade association designated to provide arbitration. One of the corporation's top employees sat on the trade association's board and the corporation paid more than $26,000 annually in dues to the association. The trade association had taken the public position that the HTA contract did not represent a futures contract, which was an issue in the case. A significant portion of the association's members had written HTA contracts. The arbitral panel placed limits on the parties' ability to conduct discovery and eventually awarded attorneys' fees to the corporation without reviewing actual [Vol. 42
2012]

1NCENTIVIZING PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Concepcion and CompuCredit as the latest examples of the Supreme
Court's intention to enforce the very arbitration clauses that other courts have found to be unconscionable or inconsistent with the substantive rights granted by federal statutes, the current deferential standard for the review of arbitral awards becomes ever more problematic. 115 Indeed, judicial deference to arbitrators and the outcomes they produce becomes especially worrisome when arbitration draws its efficacy from the enforcement power of the state and the arbitrators' and arbitral organization's role is due to their special relationship with just one of the parties, usually the more powerful repeat player, in uneven contests between that repeat player and a one-time player."' 6 As I have written before: This concern is especially strong when the one-time player is not as sophisticated as the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen the dispute resolution forum that will be used to resolve her dispute, and is either unaware of the special relationship between the neutral and the repeat player or aware of the relationship but effectively unable to challenge it.
7
Some commentators have already begun to urge more rigorous judicial review in the disparate party context' in light of the appropriateness and advantages of such rigor. ' Professor Sarah Cole has proposed that courts billing records. Furthermore, the arbitral panel's decision was subject to review by the association's national secretary.
115 ) (examining the underlying assumptions of universal de novo review by appellate courts, including: "(1) that there are correct answers to legal questions; (2) that those answers are ascertainable; (3) that those answers are articulable; and (4) that appellate courts are relatively more competent than trial courts at ascertaining and articulating those answers" due to structural advantages and their role in achieving the systemic needs of the legal system); Stephen 1. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation ofPowers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2145 (2009) (observing that if the denial of access to courts is understood as a separation-of-powers injury depriving the judiciary of its ability to check executive power, then "judicial review ensures that it is that courts, and not prison wardens or other executive branch officials, who decide the merits of the underlying claim." (emphasis added)).
should use the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing arbitral awards that are accompanied by reasoned opinions.1 20 Professor Jeff Stempel has proposed that even though arbitrators' findings of fact should continue to be granted deference, their conclusions of law should be subjected to de novo review in the same manner as judicial awards.
12 1 Both of these proposals, however, would require legislative action to amend the FAA.
12 2 Such efforts have been stymied for years, 12 3 and it is difficult to predict when the gridlock will end.1 24 Other academics have suggested that parties or judges could act to improve upon the current grounds for, and standards of, judicial review. Professor Maureen Weston has proposed that parties should be able to provide in their arbitration agreement that an arbitrator will be deemed to "exceed his authority" under state law if he issues a ruling that is not legally correct.' 2 5 Professor Paul Kirgis, meanwhile, has urged that courts should REv. 1170, 1178 (2009) (observing that requiring a reasoned explanation "would likely improve the average accuracy of arbitration decisions, but it would also increase the costs of pursuing the claim in arbitration. . . . If the concern were simply to produce fair outcomes at any cost, this solution might be superior to the current system of arbitration, but, if that is the goal, both would be inferior to simply relying on courts in the first place. The essential goal of arbitration is to provide fair outcomes at a socially affordable price.").
121 administrators' pension and disability benefit determinations pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").1 34 Somehow, in this context, the Supreme Court has managed to acknowledge the existence of structural bias and make it a relevant and important factor to be considered as part of deferential judicial review. Further, the Supreme Court has provided guidance to lower courts regarding the weight to be given to structural bias in this context and has provided examples of the information required to assess such weight. Structural bias has been given the stature of tiebreaker in close cases. Finally and most important for the purposes of this Article, the Supreme Court has also incentivized the provision of structural and procedural safeguards in order to reduce the potency of the structural incentives that encourage biased decision-making. In other words, the Supreme Court has incentivized the provision of safeguards that will enhance the likelihood of accurate decision-making. All of this has occurred while maintaining a deferential standard of review. At this point, therefore, this Article will turn to judicial review of benefit denials in the ERISA context.
VI. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF ERISA's ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
STRUCTURAL BIAS WHILE RETAINING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court has observed that "ERISA represents a 'careful balancing"l35 between encouragement of employers to provide pension, health and other employee benefit plans and the protection of employees' rights under such plans.' Nonetheless, ERISA mandates the following: plans must provide employees with information regarding such plans' features and funding; those whomanage and control plan assets bear fiduciary responsibilitiesl 39 and must establish a grievance and appeals process for participants who seek benefits;1 4 0 and employees who have been denied plan benefits have the right to challenge such denials in federal court.141 Importantly, however, ERISA does not specify the standard to be used by courts when reviewing challenges to administrators' benefit denials. 142 In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,1 43 the Supreme Court turned to the principles of trust law to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review.'44 The Court found, among other things, that a plan administrator's benefit determination should be understood as a fiduciary act, that the plan administrator is a fiduciary who owes a special duty of loyalty to plan beneficiaries, 145 and that courts should use a de novo standard in reviewing an administrator's denial of benefits-unless the plan itself provides otherwise.
Just as a court begins its assessment of a trustee's performance by turning to the provisions of the relevant trust document, a court reviewing a benefit administrator's decision must begin with the standard of review provided in the terms of the plan.1 47 Thus, if a plan grants discretionary authority to the administrator to determine whether a beneficiary's claim is eligible and valid, courts are required to use a deferential standard when reviewing a benefit denial.1 
Id
Not surprisingly, most plans now grant discretionary authority to plan administrators, and thus deferential judicial review is the norm rather than the exception. 149 Courts have used a variety of specific formulations-e.g., abuse of discretion,so arbitrary and capricious,"s unreasonable 52-but all are deferential.1 53 Once again, there are striking similarities here to the deferential standard of review used by courts when determining whether to vacate an arbitral award.
Judicial deference in the ERISA context is often problematic due to the pervasiveness of structural bias. Plan administrators generally are responsible for both determining the validity of an employee's claim and actually paying the amounts determined to be owed. The resulting structural bias is most obvious when the employer is also the plan administrator, responsible for funding the plan, evaluating claims and paying out benefits. Relying upon the trust law principles that are relevant in the ERISA context, the Supreme Court held in Firestone that an employer serving as plan administrator is operating under a conflict of interest, and such conflict has to be "weighed [by the reviewing court] as a 'factor in determining whether there [was] an abuse of discretion"" 5 7 by the employeradministrator who had denied an employee's claim for benefits.
But many employers turn to others, particularly insurance companies, and outsource responsibility for managing the plan funds, making benefit 149. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1317 (objecting that the judicial deference shown in trust law to the wishes of transferors is due to the status of the normal private trust as "essentially a gift;" in contrast, ERISA's invocation of trust law was meant "to restrict rather than to promote the autonomy of the employer over its employee benefit plans."). determinations and distributing payments to beneficiaries." 8 Obviously, there is an inherent potential for conflict of interest in the insurer's reliance on the employer for business. Arguably, though, this use of a third party should reduce the degree of conflict of interest or structural bias, in the same manner that the use of an outside arbitral organization should mitigate structural bias in consumer arbitration. Indeed, in the ERISA context, and despite the language of Firestone, some courts refused to acknowledge "inherent" or "simple and commonplace" bias as a conflict of interest, noting that the amount involved in an individual claim is often just too small to sway a decision-maker in light of many insurers' exponentially larger gross revenues, 1 and the marketplace's punishment of any insurers who develop a reputation for self-interested errors in benefit determinations.1 60 But this faith in the selflessness of decision-makers, and in the rigor imposed by economies of scale and the market, has not always been justified.'
Id. at 1320; see also
6 ' The existence and effects of structural bias among insurers in the ERISA context was revealed in 2002, in a scandal involving the thenlargest American insurer specializing in disability insurance, Unum/Provident Corporation (Unum).1
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At that time, evidence began to come to light that Unum had engaged in a variety of practices that might have helped it to maximize cost-effectiveness in claims processingl 6 3 -but that also constituted abusive claims denials-e.g., pressuring its claimsprocessing employees to deny claims in order "to meet or surpass budget goals,"'6 pressuring staff physicians to review claims too quickly to analyze them properly, not permitting physicians to request additional information or tests to aid their review of claims, and discouraging 162. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1315. Other insurers had also engaged in conduct found to represent abusive denials of benefits. Id. at 1321-22 n. 41. 163. Id at 1315. See also Cohen, supra note 161, at 964 (describing how courts were reluctant to recognize a conflict when third-party administrators were making benefit denials, but some courts recognized that administrators might want to prove their cost-effectiveness in order to be rehired for another contract term or avoid determining third party claims in a manner inconsistent with the approach it used for another employer).
164. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1318.
physicians from assisting beneficiaries to perfect their claims for disability insurance benefits.' 6 5 After litigation was commenced, discovery revealed a damning memorandum written by an Unum executive, in which the executive exulted over the advantages provided to the company by ERISA, including preemption of state law, abandonment of jury trials, banning of compensatory and punitive damages, and deferential judicial review. 66 The memorandum observed, for example, that due to the deferential standard of review established by the Firestone court as applicable to benefit denials, Unum faced much less risk of liability than it otherwise would.1 Broadly speaking, there are two plausible interpretations of the Unum/Provident scandal. Unum could be such an outlier that the saga lacks legal policy implications. On this view, a rogue insurance company behaved exceptionally badly, it got caught and was sanctioned, and its fate should deter others. The other reading of these events is less sanguine....
[C]onflicted plan decisionmaking is a structural feature of ERISA plan administration. The danger pervades the ERISA-plan world that a selfinterested plan decisionmaker will take advantage of its license under [Firestone v.] Bruch to line its own pockets by denying meritorious claims. Cases of abusive benefit denials involving other disability insurers abound. Unum turns out to have been a clumsy villain, but in the hands of subtler operators such misbehavior is much harder to detect.1
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The Unum scandal was a dramatic wake-up call within the ERISA context-in much the same manner that the Minnesota Attorney General's action against National Arbitration Forum has served as a wake-up call regarding the dangers of structural bias in mandatory predispute consumer arbitration.o 70 Indeed, the parallels between these two cases are nearly overwhelming and will be discussed infra.
Nonetheless, over the years, a conflict had emerged among the federal circuits regarding whether structural bias should be considered a conflict in the ERISA context and, if it was, how it should affect the standard of review to be used by courts reviewing insurers' benefit denials. As noted supra, some federal circuits refused to recognize a standard or ubiquitous conflict as a conflict of interest.' 7 ' Other circuits took a very different Glenn . 173 Metropolitan Life (MetLife) had served as the administrator and insurer of a Sears ERISA-governed disability insurance plan and had denied disability benefits to a Sears employee, Wanda Glenn.' 74 As is true in many of these cases, MetLife had determined that Glenn was entitled to disability insurance benefits for an initial 24-month period because she was unable to perform her particular job.17 At the cohclusion of this 24-month period, however, the plan provided that Glenn was entitled to continued disability benefits only if she could not perform any occupation for which she was qualified.1 6 MetLife denied Glenn's application for these benefits, finding that Glenn could perform in a sedentary occupation.'" Glenn challenged the denial in federal court.1 78 The District Court denied the employee's request for relief and entered judgment for the plan administrator.' Using an abuse of discretion standard but treating MetLife's conflict of interest as a "relevant factor," the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.
8 0 The Supreme Court affirmed.' 8 ' In his majority opinion, Justice Breyer observed that with ERISA, Congress intended to "offer employees enhanced protection of their benefits."l 8 2 He further observed that reliance on the protections offered by the market was insufficient due to employers' (and not employees') control of the selection of plan administrators and employers' potentially greater interest in low rates and premium payments than in accurate claims MetLife had encouraged Glenn to apply for Social Security disability benefits and then chose to disregard the Social Security Administration's finding that Glenn could not work. MetLife also emphasized one physician report indicating the Glenn could work at the expense of other, more detailed medical reports and failed to provide all of the treating physician reports to its own hired experts. Finally, MetLife ignored evidence regarding the effects of stress upon Glenn. processing.183 Interestingly, Justice Breyer also observed that ERISA itself imposes fiduciary responsibilities on administrators, thus requiring "higherthan-marketplace quality standards."l 84 For purposes of ERISA, therefore, the Supreme Court held that when a structural conflict exists, it represents a conflict of interest that must be acknowledged.
185
This holding was surprisingly significant.186 A structural bias that might be deemed "normal" or "unremarkable" in the context of a commercial contract was made "abnormal" or "aberrant" in the fiduciary context of ERISA.
187
Based on the principles of trust law, however, the majority further concluded that the existence of such a conflict could not be permitted to trigger the "special burden of proof rules,"'1 or "special procedural or evidentiary rules,"' 89 or the less deferential standards of review that several circuits had adopted. 190 Justice Breyer explained that courts were required to continue to grant deference to administrators' decisions and reverse them only if they found abuse of discretion:
Trust law continues to apply a deferential standard of review to the discretionary decision making of a conflicted trustee, while at the same time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict when determining whether the trustee, substantively or procedurally, has abused his discretion."
But if reviewing courts are required to maintain deference as they review administrators' benefit denials, what meaningful role can structural bias or "inherent" conflict play in their disposition of the case? Firestone, after all, already required "the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict."
92
Justice Breyer rejected the parallels between ERISA-regulated obligations and contract law principles that had been urged by employers and insurers.1 
187
. But see Cohen, supra note 161, at 991-92 (questioning whether ERISA beneficiaries are receiving a duty of loyalty from insurance fiduciaries if such insurers are processing both ERISA and non-ERISA claims in the same manner, with the same internal guidelines and claims processing software, and urging that claims processing should be conducted by randomly-assigned third parties). governmental officials' and administrative judges' decisions interpreting and enforcing the legal entitlements established by federal statute: We believe that Firestone means what the word "factor" implies, namely, that when judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of several different considerations of which a conflict of interest is one. This kind of review is no stranger to the judicial system. Not only trust law, but also administrative law, can ask judges to determine lawfulness by taking account of several different, often casespecific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together... .194 Finally, Justice Breyer explained how administrators' conflicted decisionmaking-or structural bias-would factor into judicial review of administrators' denial of benefits:
...
[A]ny one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the degree of closeness necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor's inherent or case-specific importance. The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should prove more important (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where an insurance comany administrator has a history of biased claims administration... . Chief Justice Roberts did not join this part of the Court's opinion because he found its requirement that courts consider the "mere existence of a conflict in every case" to be insufficiently "constrained" 9 6 and thus likely to permit judges to engage in inappropriately "exacting scrutiny" of administrators' decision-making.1 9 7 Nonetheless, his concurrence provides several additional examples of structural bias that would suggest "a higher likelihood" of influencing the denial of benefits-and thus would support a finding of abuse of discretion.' 
197.
Id. See also id at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's opinion as "nothing but de novo review in sheep's clothing" and proclaiming that "the notion that there are degrees of deference is absurd.. . . [T]he court either defers, or it does not. 'Some deference,' or 'less than total deference,' is no deference at all."); Cohen, supra note 161 at 990-91 (expressing agreement with Scalia's analysis in his Glenn dissent that the decision offers courts the opportunity to engage in de novo review, but also observing that Glenn only "moves us closer to the de novo approach" and questioning "whether it achieves the 'undivided loyalty' that ERISA promises to plan beneficiaries").
198. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 120-22 (Roberts, J., concurring).
regarding terms in a benefit plan that give "'a bonus for administrators who denied benefits to every 10' beneficiary,"" 99 evidence of "incentives and bonuses to claims reviewers for 'claims savings,"' 20 0 evidence of "a pattern or practice of unreasonably denying meritorious claims," 20 1 and evidence of "a pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials, bad faith contract misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics."
202 Graphically, this sort of evidence would be weighty enough to shift the scales of justice otherwise tipped deferentially toward the plan administrator.
In the majority opinion, meanwhile, Justice Breyer went further and provided instruction to administrators regarding their ability to influence the weight of a structural bias through the meaningful institutionalization of protections against structural bias:
It [the conflict at interest here] should prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off claims administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits. . 203 Justice Breyer's wide-ranging citations to examples of structural safeguards may be almost as instructive as the explicit guidance contained in the words 204 H eee of the opinion supra. He referenced academics' recommendations that banks establish "interdepartmental information walls to reduce bank conflict" 205 and that administrative agencies put into place "internal controls" to produce "administrative accuracy" 206 He cited to the assertions in one of the amicus briefs that insurers have "incentives to reward claims processors for their accuracy." 2 07 These structural safeguards would, of course, be in addition to ERISA's general requirement that plan administrators provide claimants with a reasoned basis, in writing, for the denial of benefits.
208
209
Following Glenn, most courts have accepted that ubiquitous conflicted decision-making is nonetheless a conflict. 2 1 0 They have also 211 accepted that they must use a deferential standard of review.
With the notable exception of the Ninth Circuit, 2 12 courts have not presumed that the existence of conflicted decision-making, by itself, will be enough to tip the balance of deferential review. Rather they have sought to assess the conflict's "weight" by examining whether: the structure of ERISA funds is such that a benefit denial will reduce the amounts paid by an employer into the plan; 213 the savings produced by denials are likely to be significant to the employer 214 or the insurer; 21 5 administrators or outside reviewers sufficiently acknowledged contrary doctors' reportS 216 or awards from the Social Security Administration; 2 1 7 and the number of referrals and amount of money paid by administrators to independent physicians was significant.
2 18 Although some courts have asserted that they are "dutybound to inquire into what steps a plan administrator has taken to insulate the decision-making process against the potentially pernicious effects of structural conflicts," 219 most courts have placed the burden squarely upon claimants to introduce evidence to substantiate the conflict's weight. 220 This is, of course, a significant burden.
2 2 1 But-and this is extraordinarily important in the context of disparate dispute resolution of any type-Glenn now entitles claimants to request discovery regarding the details of insurers' and employers' claims handling. 222 Indeed, most of Chief Justice Roberts' examples of "weightier" structural bias described supra would require claimants challenging benefit denials to request, and courts to grant, targeted discovery that goes well beyond the "administrative record" established before the claims administrator. If access to information is power-and it is-there should be little wonder that Justice Scalia dissented in Glenn and so vehemently scorned both the majority's "fondness for a judge-liberating totality-of-the-circumstances 'test"' and his colleagues' apparent smallmindedness in presuming that "all fiduciaries with a conflict act in their selfish interest." Discovery revealed that the insurer had referred 1,204 files and paid "upwards of $2,000,000 to NMR physicians" during a two-year period; the court observed that the insurer had then "refused, on burdensomeness grounds, to answer interrogatories regarding the proportion" of referred files "in which claims had ultimately been allowed." The trial court drew the inference that NMR had found against the claimants, and for the plan, 100% of the time. Judicial review of the entire record is still required.
Has the structural bias that comes from conflicted decision-making, now acknowledged as a conflict of interest, actually served as a tiebreaker in close cases? Many would say not. 234 Somehow, though, it is better than the bald-faced denial of conflict that went before. It is this clear-eyed acknowledgement of structural bias, and its potential to play the tiebreaker role, that could be exported into the arbitration jurisprudence. The clarity that comes with admitting the existence of conflict, combined with the potential transparency and accountability offered by discovery into administrators' claims processing, would at least create the potential to enhance the reality of, and a skeptical public's perception of, the thoroughness and accuracy of decision-making in mandatory predispute arbitration.
VII. APPLICATION TO MANDATORY PREDISPUTE CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Structural bias has the potential to affect third party arbitral organizations just as much as it has the potential to affect third party insurers making benefit determinations.
23 5 Indeed, the cautionary tale of the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), which once handled the majority of 236 consumer arbitrations, reveals the potential for structural bias. Admittedly, the allegations contained in the Minnesota Attorney General's complaint were never tested by a motion to dismiss, and the case never went to trial or even summary judgment. 237 Nonetheless, the complaint and newspaper reports combined to paint a picture of a complex web of private actors and overlapping financial and business relationships, all Credit card companies brought their collection matters to Mann Bracken, the large law firm, for debt collection.
2 3 9 If they were unsuccessful, the Mann Bracken lawyers referred the cases to the for-profit NAF for arbitration (which had advertised arbitration to credit card companies as a means to get customers to "basically hand you the money"). NAF and Forthright (a new company created by NAF and the private equity firm of Accretive to handle the financial aspects of NAF's operation) were responsible for making the referrals to NAF's pool of arbitrators, one of whom allegedly stopped receiving referrals after she found for a customer and against a credit card company on a relatively substantial counterclaim.
2 40 The arbitrators then conducted arbitration proceedings-and found for the credit card companies nearly 95% of the time.
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The credit card companies then turned to the courts, which transformed the arbitral awards into judgments. 24 2 Axiant, another new company created by Accretive and members of Mann Bracken, then took over and proceeded to collect on the judgments. 24 3 In this picture, NAF and arbitration were no longer focused on dispute resolution as an end in and of itself. Rather, NAF had joined with Accretive and Mann Bracken to exploit consumer arbitration's "billion-dollar business" potential, as imagined by Accretive. It is tempting for many dispute resolution proponents to understand NAF as an aberration. Likely, many in the ERISA context view Unum similarly, as an outlier or a rogue. It becomes tempting to do nothing, to assume the culprit has been found, and the crisis has been averted. That could be exactly right.
But Glenn and its progeny in the ERISA context make it clear that it is also possible to choose to be more proactive than that. It is possible for courts to continue to grant deferential review to arbitral awards, as required by the FAA, while also subjecting the evidence of structural bias to more rigorous examination. Further, Glenn suggests that structural bias can and should be understood as "evident partiality." The rigor comes in the next step-in assessing the gravity, or weight, of such partiality.
24 7 Just as many do in the context of ERISA, courts can place the burden of demonstrating the severity of the partiality upon consumers (and employees, nursing home patients and any others subject to mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in adhesive contracts). But they would also need to be more willing to grant consumers (and employees, nursing home patients and others involved in disparate party arbitration) the right to pursue post-award discovery into corporations', agencies' and arbitral firms' management of their arbitration procedures. 2 48 And if the resulting evidence demonstrates partiality that has a "high likelihood" of influencing arbitral decisionmaking, courts could and should refuse to enforce the resulting arbitral awards.
At this point, it makes sense to return to the clause at issue in Concepcion. Earlier, this Article noted that the provisions of the clause are likely to encourage consumers to pursue their individual claims.
2 49 But are the clause's provisions also sufficiently likely to "reduce potential bias and promote accuracy" in the arbitral process? Based on the Supreme Court's description of the clause in Concepcion, we know that if a consumer's claim reaches arbitration, the consumer can choose the form of arbitration that she would prefer-i.e., in person, by telephone or based only on paper submissions. 250 We also know that the arbitration must occur in the county in which customer was billed.
2 5 1 These provisions appear quite reassuring.
By providing the consumer with the opportunity to tailor the proceeding to her capacities and circumstances, these provisions are likely to enhance her ability to be heard 25 2 and thus promote the accuracy of a final decision. AT&T's clause also provides that the consumer can choose to sue in small claims court rather than arbitration.
25 3 On its face, this provision is also reassuring because it provides the consumer with an opt-out from arbitration. Indeed, this provision seems to harness the power of healthy competition between public courts and private arbitration providers. But we would need to know more about the small claims courts available to the consumer. These courts tend to have low jurisdictional caps. Further, as states have reduced funding for their courts, some courts have been forced to reduce their hours or even close for full days during the week. Obviously, such an operational change has the potential to reduce consumers' access to small claims courts. Thus, it is not clear whether the opt-out provision in AT&T's clause would actually have the effect of reducing bias and promoting accuracy. It depends.
Last and perhaps most strikingly, though, the clause at issue in Concepcion provides that if the consumer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T must pay a $7,500 minimum recovery to the consumer and twice the amount of the consumer's attorney's fees. 255 On its face, this last provision would seem quite likely to reduce potential bias-but, again, we would need to know much more about the details of these provisions' implementation. Does AT&T have written policies (or performance evaluation factors) to guide employees' decisions regarding the amount of their first settlement offers to consumers? Do such policies exist for subsequent settlement offers? On average, how many times must a consumer refuse AT&T's settlement offers in order to be offered the full amount of her claim? Do AT&T's employees tend to wait until just before the selection of the arbitrator to offer the full amount requested by a consumer? How is the available pool of arbitrators selected for these types of cases? How are arbitrators selected for particular cases? What is the contractual and financial relationship between AT&T and its arbitral provider(s)?
256 How significant is AT&T's share of each arbitral provider's gross and net revenues? 257 Is there the potential for the arbitral provider, or individual arbitrators, to receive bonuses for their work for AT&T? If yes, what is the basis for those bonuses? What information does AT&T receive about the claims made by consumers, the results of these claims and the arbitrators responsible for deciding the claims? How has AT&T used this information? Has AT&T ever used this information to improve its products or services?
258 If yes, in what way has AT&T used this information to improve its services? Etc. These sorts of details inevitably will matter in determining whether the clause's provisions will have the effect of reducing bias-or enhancing it.
There are important differences, of course, between the ERISA and consumer contexts. The ERISA jurisprudence recognizes that employees, beneficiaries, and the funds collected on their behalf need protection, and administrators are therefore obligated to operate as fiduciaries. consumer litigation, American judges have not traditionally been understood as fiduciaries. They do, however, serve in this role in some contexts, particularly when individual unsophisticated one-shot players are perceived as vulnerable to self-interested repeat players. 26 0 There are some calls for judges to imagine themselves as fiduciaries more frequently. 261 If we turn specifically to arbitral organizations and arbitrators, meanwhile, there is no language in the FAA or in the Supreme Court's arbitral jurisprudence that establishes a fiduciary duty for them, under any circumstances.
26 2 There is nothing, for example, instructing arbitrators that they owe a special duty to consumers or employees in disparate party arbitration-or that in the case of a close call, they should err on the side of those who are to be served by federal statutes specially enacted to protect vulnerable people from employment discrimination, consumer fraud, or mental or physical abuse. It should not be surprising that such language is missing from the FAA. It was originally enacted to overcome judicial hostility to the arbitration clauses that had been negotiated by sophisticated 263 lih commercial parties.
In light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that has expanded the FAA to the disparate party context, it would make sense for Congress to amend the FAA to provide that in certain specified contexts-e.g., arbitration of employment discrimination and consumer matters conducted pursuant to mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion-arbitral organizations and arbitrators are obligated to act as fiduciaries, with higher-than-marketplace quality standards.
Even in interpreting the current language of the FAA, however, courts could read a fiduciary understanding into the provisions regarding evident partiality or arbitrators exceeding their powers, as responsibility for the protection of consumers, employees and vulnerable others migrates from private attorneys general battling on behalf of their clients to the factfinding judicial adjuncts handling the many "smaller" cases-involving messy human dynamics and small financial stakes-that courts perceive they can no longer handle. If these cases must go to arbitration, it makes just as much sense in this context as in the ERISA context to import at least some of the fiduciary guidance and treatment of structural conflict offered by MetLife v. Glenn.
CONCLUSION
Either with help from the Congress or without it, our society needs our courts to play their essential role in providing the less-powerful with meaningful access to a forum where the heady promises contained in legislation will be aired and compared to reality, where meaningful redress is possible, and ultimately, where the less-powerful can experience justice. If the Supreme Court is indeed incentivizing the creation of a national, private small claims court, it also must assume responsibility for assuring the sufficiency of the justice-procedural and substantive-provided by such a court. The Supreme Court can look to its own jurisprudence-the model in Glenn-for guidance.
This model was itself inspired by administrative agencies' and regulated industries' practices. It represents one means to continue to use a deferential standard of judicial review, while also acknowledging that reliance on privatized tribunals inevitably leads to perceptions of structural bias and the unacceptably high likelihood of actual bias-and thus, must be addressed. The model offered by Glenn is also useful because it assumes that as part of courts' reviewing function, they can and should incentivize the development of procedural safeguards that reduce the effects of bias and promote accurate decision-making. Finally, the model offered by Glenn harnesses private initiative to bring transparency and accountability to privatized procedures-by encouraging consumers (and their lawyers) to demand discovery regarding arbitral providers' internal operations.
These sorts of procedural safeguards, at the very least, are what the valuable bargaining chip of class waiver should be able to buy.
